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Since recombinant DNA technology was first developed in the
early 1970's, society has been faced with the immense task of over-
seeing its use and development. Scientists have been concerned
with continuing their research free from burdensome regulations,
while policy-makers have worried about the potential for a bio-
technological disaster if such research remains unregulated. Ac-
cordingly, attempts to control the technology's potential dangers
while encouraging exploration of its benefits have caused many con-
flicts, both within and between the scientific and regulatory
communities.
The development of biotechnology has given society an awesome
new power and an equally awesome responsibility to use it wisely.
Unfortunately, the technology itself is developing so rapidly that our
regulatory strategies seem to be chasing a moving target. Indeed,
not since the discovery of atomic fission have we been presented
with such a Pandora's box of issues. Unless we are prepared to deal
rationally and competently with the implications of this new-found
power, we will reap few of its benefits and will be left with many of
its problems.'
This article will discuss the history of the regulatory debate over
biotechnology, the problems and choices it has created, and the
principles that we as citizens and representatives must understand
in order to formulate effective policy. The article will review current
regulatory institutions and arrangements critically in order to illus-
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1. One need only consider the current dilemma with nuclear weaponry to appreciate
the hazards of a technology developed with neither planning nor foresight. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that this analogy to the experience with atomic fission is not
meant to imply that biotechnology presents the same risks or is doomed to follow the
same pattern of development. Rather, it simply underscores the difficulty inherent in




trate the potential for new structures to succeed where old ones
have proven inadequate. Although the article presents the perspec-
tive of the legislative branch, it will also emphasize the roles played
by other vital participants in the process, namely scientists and the
public at large.
II. Background
Advances in biotechnology in the mid-1970's created public con-
cern over the safety of laboratory experiments. Because many such
experiments involved the use of potentially infectious bacteria,
some feared that a man-made "bug" could escape and spread a hor-
rible disease throughout the population.
2
Such a fear was not unfounded, and the prevalence of this con-
cern resulted in the first attempt to create a regulatory framework
for biotechnology. This early effort at oversight was the culmination
of an ambitious self-regulatory push within the scientific community
itself, with little prompting from the government. At a now famous
conference held in Asilomar, California in 1975, many of the lead-
ing figures in this emerging science established guidelines for labo-
ratory procedures and a process for the review of future
experimental techniques.
3
The Asilomar guidelines for research were widely accepted and
implemented by the scientific community. In addition to substan-
tive recommendations for proper laboratory methods, the guide-
lines called for the creation of a National Institutes of Health (NIH)
advisory committee on recombinant DNA research. The recom-
mendations of the Asilomar Conference were immediately adopted
by the NIH, until such time as the new Recombinant DNA Advisory
Committee (RAC) could formulate its own regulations.
Sixteen months later, the RAC and NIH produced a detailed se-
ries of regulations for recombinant DNA research. 4 The Asilomar
guidelines were used as the starting point for the development of
regulations seeking to bind recipients of government grants for such
research. A program of voluntary compliance by private research
organizations was also instituted through the RAC which has been
2. For a discussion of these early concerns see N. WADE, THE ULTIMATE EXPERIMENT
127-41 (1977).
3. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE: THE SOCIAL AND ETHICAL
ISSUES OF GENETIC ENGINEERING WITH HUMAN BEINGS 10-11 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
SPLICING LIFE].
4. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976).
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generally successful to date. 5
The swift response of the scientific community to the perceived
dangers of early recombinant DNA research allowed the technology
to develop for several years with a minimum of controversy. The
original guidelines of the Asilomar Conference played a crucial role
in the development of biotechnology. Their widespread acceptance
by scientists calmed the public's fear both of a biological accident
and of the technology itself. In addition, the guidelines demon-
strated that interim self-regulation by the scientific community was
viable in the field of genetic engineering.
Public confidence in biotechnology was also enhanced by the cre-
ation of the RAC within the NIH (essentially as recommended at
Asilomar). The RAC proved to be an effective forum for the discus-
sion of any new experiments. 6 Also, the safety of laboratory tech-
niques for genetic experiments was quickly demonstrated;
consequently, the regulations have been relaxed over time. 7 Most
government-sponsored genetic research is now exempted from
compliance with the most stringent RAC regulations.
8
As a result of scientists' excellent laboratory safety record, the
public has grown less fearful of accidental disaster and has begun to
appreciate the promising future of biotechnology. However, new
and more complicated issues have arisen. If not handled properly,
they could place that future in jeopardy.
Policy-makers today are more concerned with the control of pur-
poseful applications of biological engineering and genetic "tinker-
ing" than with the unintended release of organisms from
laboratories. 9 On a variety of fronts, genetic technology is advanc-
ing so rapidly that it may surpass the ability of our existing institu-
tions to control it. It is presenting our society with new choices and
decisions, and unlike earlier concerns, the problems presented now
cannot be resolved by the scientific community alone. Because the
decisions to be made involve moral and ethical issues, they must be
discussed by all members of society, rather than any particular
5. See SPLICING LIFE, supra note 3, at 12-13. However, the lasting impact of the vol-
untary scheme remains to be seen. See infra note 37.
6. See Human Genetic Engineering: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Over-
sight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1982) (testi-
mony of Alexander Capron, Executive Director, President's Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings: Human Genetic Engineering].
7. See infra note 35.
8. SPLICING LIFE, supra note 3, at 12-13.




group or decision-making body. The government, particularly Con-
gress, must play an increasingly active role to ensure widespread
participation in the decision-making process, and it must attempt to
build a true consensus by educating the public about genetic engi-
neering. Otherwise, the momentum of the biotechnology industry
may decide these issues for us.
III. Prospects and Problems
It is ironic that the dilemmas presented by biotechnology arise
from its potential benefits to so many areas of our lives. The devel-
opment of the technology has proceeded along two basic lines, each
with its own set of promises and problems. The first broad line in-
volves the commercial (i.e., agricultural and industrial) applications
of the technology and the potential dangers presented by the delib-
erate release of new genetically engineered organisms into the envi-
ronment. The second, and in many ways more significant, line
encompasses the human applications of the technology and the awe-
some responsibility that accompanies the power to alter the genetic
basis of human life.
A. Commercial Applications and their Environmental Implications
As the safety of recombinant DNA research in the laboratory was
demonstrated over the years, commercial ventures rapidly began to
develop applications of the technology; as a result research became
concentrated along commercial lines.' 0 Major advancements in the
ability to cleave and rejoin DNA and to insert recombinant DNA
into new organisms gave scientists the means to alter organisms rap-
idly and effectively. Spurred by the 1980 Supreme Court decision in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,' I which permitted the patenting of new life
forms, the biotechnology industry has burgeoned over the last few
years. Recent research into the genetic modification of micro-
10. See generally CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF
APPLIED GENETICS 49-192 (1981)[hereinafter cited as IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS].
See also CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMMERCIAL BIOTECH-
NOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS (1984).
11. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). ChiefJustice Burger, writing for the majority, emphasized
the non-justiciable political nature of a decision to exempt new life forms from patent
protection. 447 U.S. at 317. Accordingly, the majority refused to credit evidence
proferred by scientists and environmental activists in opposition to Dr. Chakrabarty's
patent application and held that the organism was patentable under a "plain reading" of
the Patent Act. Justice Brennan, writing for the four dissenters (Justices Brennan, Pow-
ell, White, and Marshall), deemed the evidence worthy of note precisely because the
patentability of new life-forms "uniquely implicates matters of public concern." 447
U.S. at 322.
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organisms, plants, and animals appears to have wide potential appli-
cability to both agriculture and industry.' 2 In certain cases the
research has reached the point of field testing and commercial
application. '
3
In June, 1983, the House Science and Technology Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversight held hearings to explore the poten-
tial consequences of the deliberate release of genetically engineered
organisms into the environment.' 4 Concern existed, and continues
to exist, because of the development of many commercially lucrative
and socially beneficial uses of biotechnology that involve the release
of new organisms outside the laboratory. These concerns tend to
focus not on the ethical dilemmas presented by human applications,
but rather on the potential environmental impact and uncertain eco-
logical consequences presented by any biotechnological release.'
5
Using biotechnology, scientists have created a host of new
organisms that could bring tremendous benefits to the world. For
example, researchers are rapidly developing new varieties of plants,
some of which can survive under even the most adverse conditions,
and others that produce yields many times greater than those that
are now possible. These stronger crops might be able to reduce
12. IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS, supra note 10, at 49-108; The Environmental Impli-
cations of Genetic Engineering: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology and the Subcomm. on Science, Research, and Technology of
the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-95 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings: Environmental Implications] See also CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, ANIMAL
SCIENCES: ADVANCES IN REPRODUCTIVE AND HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES: REPORT PREPARED
FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCI-
ENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, RECENT
ADVANCES IN THE PLANT SCIENCES: APPLICATIONS TO AGRICULTURE AND AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTS: REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (1984).
13. Three deliberate release requests for field testing of genetically engineered orga-
nisms have been approved by the RAC, although none have been implemented. See 46
Fed. Reg. 40,331 (1981)(use of recombinant DNA to investigate transformation events);
48 Fed. Reg. 16,459 (1983)(use of recombinant bacterial and yeast DNA on tomato and
tobacco plants to investigate transformation events); 48 Fed. Reg. 24,549 (1983)(treat-
ing plants with recombinant bacterial DNA to study ice nucleation patterns). The first
two tests are not ready for final implementation. The commencement of the third test
was halted by preliminary injunction. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587
F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984).
14. Hearings: Environmental Implications, supra note 12. As a member of the House of
Representatives, Senator Gore chaired the Subcommittee and conducted the hearings.
Steve Owens served as counsel to the Subcommittee.
15. This is not to say that ethical dilemmas may not arise from continued and ex-
panded use of commercial applications of biotechnology. They may arise in the future
from unforeseen developments within the range of commercial releases, or from the
interrelationships of agricultural, medical, industrial and zoological applications. It is





world hunger significantly at some point in the future.' 6
Scientists are also working on the creation of new microorganisms
that can prevent frost damage to crops, 17 clean up oil spills,' 8 detox-
ify hazardous waste, 19 enhance mineral recovery from the earth, 20
and help convert biomass to energy,2 1 to name a few potential appli-
cations. It is easy to imagine the significant benefits to be derived
from, for example, a microorganism that can break down hazardous
waste into its non-toxic components. Our nation has a tremendous
problem with toxic waste disposal, and existing technologies offer
little hope for a long-term solution. 22 The microorganisms now be-
ing contemplated would attack everything from dioxin to PCBs.2 3
To date, work on these new plants and microorganisms has been
limited to the laboratory. In fact, the research guidelines that
emerged from the Asilomar Conference contained a ban on the re-
lease of new organisms into the environment. 24 That ban has been
honored until this time. Recently, however, such substantial pro-
gress has been made in the laboratory that researchers and their
commercial backers are anxious to proceed with field tests of their
creations. 25 Without such experimentation it is difficult, if not im-
possible, to determine whether genetically altered organisms will
both survive in the natural environment and perform on a commer-
cial scale. Simply put, it does little good to have a "bug" that can
eat hazardous waste if it is never released into a contaminated area.
Scientists, as well as concerned citizens and Congress, are also
concerned about how such releases may affect the delicate ecologi-
cal balance of the natural environment. This potential disruption is
16. See Hearings: Environmental Implications, supra note 12, at 77-80 (statement of Dr.
Ralph Hardy); IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS, supra note 10, at 137-164.
17. See 48 Fed. Reg. 24,549 (1983).
18. Such an organism is described in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
See supra note 11.
19. See Hearings: Environmental Implications, supra note 12, at 59-61 (statement of Dr.
Ananda Chakrabarty); IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS, supra note 10, at 126-27.
20. See IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS, supra note 10, at 117-19.
21. See id. at 293-303.
22. See Florini, Issues of Federalism in Hazardous Waste Control: Cooperation or Confusion?,
6 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 307, 307-308 (1982), and sources cited therein.
23. Hearings: Environmental Implications, supra note 12, at 62-64 (statement of Dr.
Ananda Chakrabarty).
24. The Conference Report indicates that the ban was implemented because of the
possibility of great danger to laboratory workers and the public, the difficulty in deter-
mining the magnitude of the risks, and the inadequacy of contemporary containment
capabilities. See Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, Risks and Benefits, Rights and Responsibilities: A
History of the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1032-33
(1978), citing Berg, Baltimore, Brenner, Roblin & Singer, Summary Statement of the Asilomar
Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 72 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U. S. A. 1983 (1975).
25. See supra note 13.
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extraordinarily difficult to estimate. Predictions based on the effects
of naturally arising organisms are of limited relevance because bio-
technology is now producing many genetically engineered organ-
isms with genotypes that did not previously exist.
The search for an accurate risk assessment methodology might be
aided by an examination of natural analogues of biotechnological
releases. For instance, human beings have adapted natural agricul-
tural conditions to suit their needs throughout the history of civiliza-
tion.26 The primary tools used in this adaptation have been
crossbreeding and hybridization, which slowly develop and enhance
desirable, naturally occurring mutations. Such techniques have
made possible the "green revolution," 27 as well as the creation of
new breeds of animals such as mules.
On the other hand, history is replete with examples of the
problems created by the introduction of exotic organisms into envi-
ronments to which they are not native and in which they have no
natural enemies. For example, the gypsy moth was brought into this
country in the nineteenth century as part of an effort to increase silk
production; a few moths escaped and multiplied, and now gypsy
moths destroy thousands of acres of American forests each year.
The organisms that cause Dutch elm disease and chestnut blight en-
tered the country accidentally; over the years, they have killed
countless trees. Starlings were imported as pets; today, they travel
in massive flocks, causing serious economic damage and posing a
health hazard wherever they land. As a final example, kudzu was in-
troduced into the southern United States in an attempt to control
soil erosion. It may have helped prevent erosion, but it has spread
dramatically throughout the South, often eliminating other forms of
vegetation. 28
Considering all these factors, the Investigations Subcommittee
concluded that while the possibility of any real harm resulting from
a biotechnological release is small, the damage that could occur is
great. In other words, any deliberate release presents a "low
probability, high consequence" risk.
29
26. IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS, supra note 10, at 137.
27. See Chandler, The Scientific Basis for the Increased Yield Capacity of Rice and Wheat, and
Its Present and Potential Impact on Food Production in the Developing Countries, in FOOD, POPU-
LATION, AND EMPLOYMENT: THE IMPACT OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION 25 (1973).
28. An excellent discussion of the problems caused in the past by the introduction
of exotic organisms into the environment is contained in F. SHARPLES, SPREAD OF
ORGANISMS WITH NOVEL GENOTYPES: THOUGHTS FROM AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 8-
25 (1982), reprinted in Hearings: Environmental Implications, supra note 12, at 157-208.




All of the benefits and risks discussed here constitute only the
roughest outline of factors to be evaluated during the risk assess-
ment stage of an experiment. Unfortunately, testimony presented
;to the Subcommittee at the June 1983 hearings indicated that pre-
,dicting the specific type, magnitude, or probability of environmental
effects associated with a given release will be extremely difficult, if
not impossible.30 As previously noted, this is primarily because no
historical or scientific data reflects the behavioral characteristics of
genetically engineered organisms outside the laboratory. Neverthe-
less, the testimony indicated that it is possible to devise procedures
to produce generalized estimates of the probability of environmen-
tal damage. 3' Clearly, these estimates must be used until better pre-
dictive methods are developed.
B. Governmental Oversight
1. The Current Regulatory Scheme
As long as the questions posed by biotechnology involved only
matters of laboratory safety, the existing regulatory regime, largely
consisting of NIH guidelines and RAC implementation, was suffi-
cient. However, in the last few years, the expanding commercial po-
tential of biotechnology has revived concerns about the adequacy of
governmental oversight. As pressure increases to take genetically
engineered organisms out of the laboratory and into the environ-
ment, Congress must determine how to ensure proper evaluation of
the risks from deliberate release without unduly burdening the de-
velopment of technology, and it must also decide whether the cur-
rent regulatory scheme is adequate to perform this evaluation.
Extensive hearings by the Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight inJune 1983 made it clear that the current scheme of fed-
eral regulation does not guarantee that the potential environmental
effects of a deliberate release will be adequately assessed.3 2 The
central problems of the regulatory framework include its scattered
authority, which has resulted in a "balkanized" regime of biotech-
nology oversight, and the limited expertise of the agencies involved.
These flaws reveal the need to develop a comprehensive and cen-
tralized regulatory scheme. To respond to the difficult risk assess-
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF GE-
NETIC ENGINEERING 13-20 (Comm. Print 1984)[hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
30. Hearings: Environmental Implications, supra note 12, at 9-16 (statement of Dr. Mar-
tin Alexander, Cornell University); id. at 22-24 (statement of Dr. Frances Sharpies, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory); STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 20-24.
31. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 20-24.
32. Id. at 24-25.
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ment problems presented by biotechnology, governing agencies
must possess both the expertise to evaluate properly the risks of re-
lease and the authority to. enforce their decisions on uses and
releases .33
The NIH guidelines, as overseen by the RAC, until recently con-
stituted the only existing regulatory system governing deliberate
biotechnological releases.3 4 The RAC was created, not primarily as
a regulatory agency, but as an advisory body of experts to promul-
gate rules on safe laboratory practices and to prescribe physical and
biological containment levels to protect against harmful environ-
mental release. 35 The deliberate release of any organism containing
recombinant DNA requires the approval of the RAC, but only if
such release is being conducted by an institution that receives sup-
port from the federal government.3 6 Privately funded biotechnol-
ogy research cannot be controlled by these guidelines.3 7 Thus,
although the RAC is the only federal entity that has had active re-
sponsibility for evaluating risks associated with biotechnology, its
authority does not extend to the regulation of most commercial
research.
The RAC has developed a narrow regulatory focus and expertise
as a consequence of the NIH guidelines. Originally, the deliberate
release into the environment of any organism containing a recombi-
nant DNA molecule was completely prohibited, but in 1978 the
guidelines were modified to allow the RAC to approve releases on a
33. See McChesney & Adler, Biotechnology Released From the Lab: The Environmental Reg-
ulatoiy Framework, 13 ENVrL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,366, 10,369 (1983).
34. The NIH guidelines were promulgated under the general powers and duties of
the Public Services Health Act, 42 U.S.C. §241(a)(1982). The original guidelines appear
at 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976). The most current version is presented at 48 Fed. Reg.
24,556 (1983).
35. Biological and physical containment refers to the need to confine certain classes
of organisms to the laboratory because of their potential to become infectious or be
destroyed once released. Special equipment, laboratory design, and procedures are des-
ignated by the regulations for each of four containment levels. See 48 Fed. Reg. 24,569
(1983). These restrictions have been steadily relaxed in recent years as it became appar-
ent that the underlying risks had been overestimated. See McChesney and Adler, supra
note 33, at 10,370 n.45.
36. The guidelines apply to all NIH-sponsored and other federally funded research.
48 Fed. Reg. 24,557 (1983). Failure to comply with the guidelines may result in revoca-
tion of funding. Id. at 24,563. These guidelines are limited, however, to genetic engi-
neering techniques that involve "molecules that are constructed outside living cells by
joining natural or synthetic DNA segments to DNA molecules that can replicate in a
living cell." Id. at 24,557. Certain types of genetic research do not fall within this cate-
gory. See McChesney and Adler, supra note 33, at 10,370 & n.50.
37. Individuals, corporations, and institutions that are not federally funded cannot
be required to comply with the guidelines. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,563 (1983). Such private
institutions are encouraged to comply and are assured of confidentiality if they do so,




case-by-case basis.3 Although the guidelines have not essentially
changed since 1978, the role of the RAC has evolved from a con-
tainment-focused lab safety monitor to a regulator of proposals for
deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms into the envi-
ronment. The RAC has already received and approved release ap-
plications, although no biotechnology experiment has yet been
conducted in the field. 39 However, the RAC guidelines are not ade-
quate to deal with this new regulatory role: they offer no risk-assess-
ment procedure, nor are they binding upon commercial research.
40
Because research has advanced to the point where commercial ap-
plications are imminent and field testing has become crucial, some
of the highly competitive biotechnology firms may decide not to re-
quest RAC approval 4 ' since the process can impose costly delays in
the testing and marketing of products. 42 Thus, the RAC, as con-
ceived under the NIH guidelines, cannot fully address and resolve
the problems posed by commercial release.
43
In addition to questions about the comprehensiveness and effec-
tiveness of the RAC's authority, there are serious shortcomings in
the review procedure employed by the RAC to evaluate release pro-
posals. The procedure is surprisingly amorphous, with no stand-
ardized method for assessing the environmental risks of field
testing, nor even any criteria for deciding what information is neces-
sary for such an assessment.
44
38. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,548-49 (1983). The RAC was to work with a private commercial
group proposing a release through an Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), set up
by the private company and registered with the RAC. The RAC would assess the appli-
cation for release presented by the IBC and determine whether it presented a "signifi-
cant risk to health or to the environment." If so, no release was to be allowed. 43 Fed.
Reg. 60,126 (1978). Unfortunately, no methodology was formulated to assess the risk of
release in 1978, and no standards have been developed for risk assessment to date. 43
Fed. Reg. 60,083 (1978).
39. See supra note 13.
40. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment found that the guidelines
"do not address the full scope of the risks of genetic engineering. They cover one tech-
nique, albeit the most important; they do not address admittedly uncertain long-term
cultural risks; they are not legally binding on researchers receiving funds from agencies
other than NIH; and they are not binding on industry." IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS.
supra note 10, at 217.
41. While commercial firms have been complying voluntarily with the guidelines,
there is no requirement that they continue to do so. Even now, only 52 of over 300
biotechnology firms in existence have IBCs registered with the RAC. STAFF REPORT,
supra note 29, at 28.
42. Id. at 27. Moreover, the fact that the guidelines require extensive use of very
expensive safety features reduces the incentives of private firms to comply voluntarily.
43. Id. at 44.
44. Id. at 29. Applications are often submitted with incomplete data because the
RAC does not specify the type or comprehensiveness of material required. Currently,
information does not have to be submitted until 30 days before consideration, and confi-
dential information does not circulate prior to that time at all. Release requests have
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Furthermore, the RAC's composition casts doubt on its ability to
assess adequately the environmental impact data in release requests.
At the time of the June 1983 hearings, the RAC included no mem-
ber trained in ecological or environmental science, 45 nor did it em-




The shortcomings of the RAC were highlighted when, at the urg-
ing of several environmental groups, a district court ruled that the
RAC had violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)47
by failing to require an environmental impact statement for an ap-
proved release. 4 8 This decision called into question the legality of
the entire RAC review process. While the court of appeals later
lifted the district court's injunction against RAC approval of any ap-
plication for release, 49 questions still remain as to the adequacy of
the RAC's risk assessment capability.
2. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Department
of Agriculture
Partly because of the problems of the RAC, other federal agen-
cies have attempted to exert control over deliberate release. Doubts
exist, however, about their ability to regulate these releases or even
to coordinate regulation with the RAC. The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
arguably have both the statutory authority and the technical exper-
tise to regulate the introduction of specific genetically engineered
organisms into the environment by commercial groups. A number
of environmentally related statutes provide each agency with au-
thority over new substances and foreign organisms. 50 None of these
statutes, however, was designed specifically for genetically engi-
ranged from one page submissions to elaborate documents. Recently, however, the
NIH proposed guidelines to expand the type of information to be submitted and
standardized its format. See 50 Fed. Reg. 12,456 (1985).
45. The Director of NIH appointed Dr. Frances Sharples, a terrestrial ecologist, to
the RAC at Senator Gore's suggestion after these hearings. Mr. David Pramer, a micro-
bial ecologist, was recently named to the RAC as well.
46. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 30 n.54.
47. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4361 (1977).
48. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F.Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984).
49. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The
Court of Appeals did find, however, that the District Court's injunction against the Uni-
versity of California's deliberate release experiment was "completely proper." Id. at 158.
50. For an excellent discussion of these statutes and their implications for govern-
ment oversight of commercial applications, see McGarity & Bayer, Federal Regulation of
Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 VAND. L. REv. 461 (1983); McChesney & Adler, supra




neered organisms, and none has been tested in the courts as a legiti-
mate instrument for the regulation of biotechnology.
The EPA has claimed jurisdiction to regulate biotechnology
under both the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) 51 and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).5 2 FIFRA
suggests that the EPA has authority to regulate genetically engi-
neered organisms in pesticides, but jurisdiction is limited to this
narrow field. Similarly, because TSCA grants regulatory authority
over "chemical substances," the EPA will be able to oversee the
release of genetically engineered organisms only to the extent that
the life forms themselves can be characterized as such. 53 Such a
characterization has yet to be examined by Congress or the courts.
Even if the EPA has clear jurisdiction to oversee deliberate release
proposals of commercial entities, its technical ability to do so is
questionable. The EPA has never been involved in regulating ge-
netically engineered organisms and has no staff with the expertise to
examine the risk assessment questions. 54 The EPA has developed
no methodologies to evaluate "environmental fate, human and ex-
perimental exposure, and potential environmental and health
hazards of genetically engineered organisms." 55 Moreover, the EPA
review procedure under TSCA requires the agency to justify a rejec-
tion of a release proposal, unlike the RAC process which begins with
a presumption against release.
56
The statutory authority of the USDA is even more problematic
than that of the EPA. Several statutes arguably provide for USDA
jurisdiction over genetically engineered organisms, 57 but to date the
agency has shown no real initiative in this area. Furthermore, the
USDA also has limited expertise applicable to the regulation of bio-
technology. 58 Whether the USDA will become active in biotechnol-
ogy remains to be seen. Should the agency seek to increase its role,
as it was recently urged to do by a National Academy of Sciences
51. 7 U.S.C. §§136-136y (1980).
52. 15 U.S.C. §§2601-2629 (1982). FIFRA and TSCA are arguably the principal
statutes defining EPA authority over biotechnology. Other statutes, such as the Clean
Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Clean Air Act. may
also provide the EPA with authority to regulate various aspects of biotechnological re-
lease, but this mandate is unclear.
53. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 32-33.
54. Hearings: Environmental Implications, supra note 12, at 126-27, 131-32 (testimony
of Donald Clay, Acting Assistant Director, Office of Pesticide and Toxic Substances, En-
vironmental Protection Agency).
55. Id. at 132.
56. Id. at 142 (statement of Dr. Edgar L. Kendrick, Acting Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for Science and Education, United States Department of Agriculture).
57. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 35-41.
58. Id. at 40.
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panel, '5 9 the regulatory issues in this area would be further compli-
cated. Because of the uncertainty surrounding USDA's role, the
General Accounting Office is currently reviewing the statutory au-
thority of the agency over biotechnology.
60
3. Summary
The status of current federal oversight of deliberate commercial
releases of genetically engineered organisms is uncertain, and the
regulatory framework is riddled with gaps. No one statute gives any
one agency complete and express jurisdiction over commercial bio-
technology. The scope of agency activity is limited, with the result
that the pressing concerns about the environmental implications of
release are not properly addressed. No agency has enough exper-
tise in both the scientific and the regulatory aspects of the problem
to process a stream of applications for deliberate releases. There is
also no formal mechanism by which the RAC, the EPA, and the
USDA can coordinate their regulatory efforts. Indeed, what has re-
sulted is a "balkanization" of regulatory responsibility and experi-
ence which could result in the inadequate assessment of release
proposals.
6 '
C. Proposals for Reform
Because of the apparent regulatory vacuum, the Investigations
Subcommittee recommended the formation of an inter-agency task
force within the executive branch to review the jurisdiction of the
various agencies with respect to the evaluation of release proposals
and to begin the process of developing a risk assessment methodol-
ogy. 62 In response to this recommendation, the Administration
formed the Cabinet Council Working Group on Biotechnology in
April 1984. In December 1984 the working group issued a docu-
ment which set forth the perspective of several agencies -the EPA,
the USDA, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)- con-
cerning their respective abilities to oversee aspects of biotechnol-
ogy. The document contained policy statements from the three
agencies outlining the regulatory steps each intends to take and the
statutory authority under which each would act.
63
59. COMM. ON BIOSCIENCES RESEARCH IN AGRICULTURE OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR BIOSCIENCES RESEARCH IN AGRICULTURE 105-17 (1985).
60. The GAO review was initiated at the request of Senator Gore, who was then a
member of the House of Representatives.
61. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 4 1-42.
62. Id. at 43-51.




Additionally, the document proposed the creation of' an in-
dependent Biotechnology Science Board (BSB) to oversee activities
pertaining to biotechnology within the executive branch. Five agen-
cies (EPA, USDA, FDA, NIH, and the National Science Foundation)
would form scientific advisory committees to provide technical ex-
pertise to the board. Each agency is to send a summary of any pro-
posal it receives to its scientific advisory committee. The committee
will then review the proposal and report to the agency's head on the
proposal's acceptability. The BSB would also receive a copy of the
proposal for comment and review.
64
The thrust of the Working Group's recommendation is to estab-
lish a RAC-like entity within each one of the relevant agencies (with
the exception of NIH, in which the original RAC continues to oper-
ate). At first glance, this appears to be a step toward ensuring that
an adequate risk assessment is made of every deliberate release of
genetically engineered organisms. The plan, however, may not be
all that it is promised to be. Indeed, while the plan aims to coordi-
nate activities within the executive branch, the proliferation of RAC-
like committees within the agencies could actually result in in-
creased balkanization of those efforts. 65 Thus, whether the proposal
is either workable or desirable remains to be seen.
That the five agencies concerned might pursue their own particu-
lar interests is an unfortunate but realistic possibility, and to the ex-
tent that the "mini-RACs" escape the BSB's control and oversight,
the goal of coordination will be thwarted. The most daunting
problems for the government in regulating biotechnology have
been the lack of much needed expertise within individual agencies
and the divergent responsibilities of each agency. The EPA, for ex-
ample, has considerable expertise with regard to environmental
concerns but almost none concerning biotechnology. The NIH is
the primary agency overseeing genetic engineering research, but it
deals very little with environmental matters. Biotechnology is best
treated as an interdisciplinary field, and the federal regulatory effort
should recognize this fact. The agencies must, at a minimum, pool
their resources and share their expertise.
Moreover, the Working Group's plan is premised on the assump-
tion that existing statutes provide the agencies with authority to reg-
ulate biotechnology. As noted earlier, questions remain about the
64. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,904 (1984).
65. See Culliton, New Biotech Review Board Planned, 229 SCIENCE 736 (1985).
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jurisdictional scope of several statutes. 66 As the RAC's litigation ex-
perience has shown, little can be taken for granted in this area. At
present, however, a wait-and-see approach seems best. Congress
should allow the current Administration effort to proceed for now, if
only because it reflects the agencies' intention to do something
rather than nothing. The challenge facing Congress as a result of
this latest regulatory proposal is to determine where the executive
branch's efforts are proceeding effectively and where they are not.
Subsequent to the Science Investigations Subcommittee hearing
in June 1983, two other congressional committees examined the de-
liberate release issue.67 Neither committee issued a report on its
review, but it is clear that each was likewise concerned that adequate
steps be taken to protect the environment. Additional hearings will
inevitably be held on the subject.
It is too early to conclude that new legislation is needed to ad-
dress the problem of deliberate releases. As long as the Administra-
tion's effort proceeds smoothly, there is no real need for a
legislative counter-effort. Of course, in the event that the current
regulatory scheme is invalidated by the courts or is otherwise ren-
dered inadequate, Congress will have to decide how best to guard
against the potential hazards of deliberate releases without unduly
burdening the development of socially beneficial technology. It
should be recognized that throughout this regulatory process, Con-
gress' role will be primarily one of oversight and review. Congress
has neither the desire nor the technical expertise to become en-
meshed in the scientific minutiae that characterize the field of bio-
technology. Moreover, that is not its purpose. It is the role of
Congress to ensure that the right questions are being asked and to
make certain that a process is established whereby the answers to
those questions can be found. This is the case with all legislation
involving health, the environment, science and related issues. Con-
gress must look to "outsiders" such as scientists, industrialists, envi-
ronmentalists, and concerned citizens for assistance in defining the
questions and outlining the parameters for a regulatory approach.
Once a regulatory approach has been defined, the task of develop-
ing specific regulations is delegated to the executive branch. Con-
66. See supra text accompanying notes 50-60.
67. See The Potential Environmental Consequence of Genetic Engineering: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Toxic Substances and Environmental Oversight of the Senate Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Biotechnology Regulations: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th




gress then reviews the actions of the executive branch to ensure that
it is fulfilling the legislative mandate, but it tries to avoid involve-
ment in the actual regulation writing. In short, governmental over-
sight in the field of biotechnology must be a cooperative venture;
the regulatory scheme must account for the respective roles of Con-
gress and federal agencies and appropriately utilize the capabilities
of each.
IV. Human Applications-Gene Therapy
A. Issues Involved
Gene therapy presents the greatest challenge of biotechnology for
our society, if not for all of civilization. Biotechnology is providing
us with vast amounts of information about the genetic basis of life,
68
and scientists are beginning to understand how to intervene directly
in the human genome to affect dramatically the fundamental charac-
teristics of human beings.
Human gene therapy can be divided into two broad categories:
somatic therapy and germline therapy. Somatic therapy affects only
the cells of the individual being treated, while germline therapy af-
fects the germ cells 69 and thus the offspring of the individual.
70
The most immediate use of either type of gene therapy would be in
68. One example of the dynamic character of biotechnology is the expanding use of
genetic screening in the workplace. Such testing allows employers to determine whether
a particular employee or job candidate is especially susceptible to some ailment based
on an examination of his or her genetic make-up. While workplace genetic screening
may seem to be a blessing in that it allows the employer to shield high-risk individuals
from potentially life-threatening environments, the discriminatory potential of such
screening is obvious. If employment decisions are based on such hypersusceptibility,
and these traits have a disproportionate incidence among economically disadvantaged
minorities, screening may become yet another invidious form of constitutionally imper-
missible discrimination. Thus the apparent boon brings with it a sobering bane. These
issues were examined in depth during hearings of the Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight of the House Committee on Science and Technology. Senator Gore was
chairman of this subcommittee when he served in the House of Representatives. See
Genetic Screening and the Handling of High Risk Groups in the Workplace, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Genetic Screening of Workers, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investiga-
tions and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
69. "Germ" or "germline" refers to those cells which are passed through the gener-
ations as part of the reproductive process.
70. See SPLICING LIFE, supra note 3, at 46. Scientists have already achieved the ability
to make changes in the inherited physical characteristics of animals. In one experiment,
the eye-color gene of fruit flies was altered, and the change in eye color was passed on to
the offspring. See Spradling & Rubin, Genetic Transformation of Drosophila with Transposa-
ble Element Vectors, 218 SCIENCE 348 (1982). In the other experiment, a rat growth gene
was spliced into the germline cells of several mice. The offspring of the mice inherited
the growth trait, and in maturity were twice the size of normal mice. See Building Bigger
Alice Through Gene Transfer, 218 SCIENCE 1298 (1982).
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the treatment of certain diseases. Scientists already know that many
serious diseases such as sickle-cell anemia, Tay-Sachs disease, and
Lesch-Nyhan syndrome have genetic-based causes. They also be-
lieve that many others, including cystic fibrosis, muscular dystrophy,
hemophilia, and some forms of cancer, similarly result from genetic
disorders. 7' By correcting defects through somatic gene therapy, an
individual could be cured of an illness. Gene therapy performed on
the germline cells of individuals could prevent the defective genes
from being passed on to future generations, thus allowing for the
total eradication of some diseases.
There seems to be almost universal agreement that somatic gene
therapy ought to be used to cure genetically based diseases in indi-
viduals. However, there is a fine line between altering a gene to cure
a disease and altering a gene to "enhance" a physical trait. Traits
such as eye color and hair color are known to be genetically based.
Other characteristics, such as personality, memory, and intelligence,
are also thought by some to be derived from genes or gene clus-
ters.72 Using somatic gene therapy to enhance physical traits is not
as clearly desirable as using it to cure diseases. Most people in-
volved in the debate do not think trait enhancement is advisable, but
some find it acceptable.
Even more difficult ethical questions are raised by germline gene
therapy. The human genetic structure is the result of a long process
that scientists do not fully understand. The effects that would be
triggered if the genetic pattern were altered are unknown. A com-
monly cited example of the problems that could arise if certain ge-
netic defects were completely eliminated from the gene pool is the
connection between sickle-cell anemia and malaria immunity. 73
Sickle-cell anemia carriers have a high resistance to malaria. If the
sickle-cell gene were eliminated from the gene pool, no more carri-
ers would exist. Other things being equal, tropical zone popula-
tions would, as a statistical matter, be much more susceptible to
malaria. While this problem might be controlled through a vaccina-
tion program, the costs of eliminating sickle-cell anemia might out-
weigh the benefits. One way suggested to deal with the kind of
problem posed by links between genetic disorders and disease pro-
tection is to create "gene banks" in which genes could be stored and
71. See. e.g., Hearings: Human Genetic Engineering, supra note 6, at 275-76 (statement of
Dr. Theodore Friedmann) (discussion of genetically based diseases).
72. Id. at 288 (statement of Dr. W. French Anderson).





remain available for future generations.74 While this idea may have
merit, it raises a host of new questions such as which genes would be
stored, what they would be used for, and who would make these
decisions.
Another ethical question raised by germline therapy is that of
iconsent. Future generations are unable to give their informed con-
sent to genetic manipulation. The decision to alter germline cells
has an impact far beyond the generation initially receiving the treat-
merit. In such a case, society would in effect be acting as the agent
not only of the child, but of all future generations as well. In some
instances, such as Tay-Sachs disease, the benefits of eliminating the
disease seem to be so immense that the consent of future genera-
tions may be taken for granted. Not all cases, however, will be so
clear. 75
The problems raised by somatic therapy pale in comparison to the
ethical conundrums raised by germline therapy. The same technol-
ogy that may allow the eradication of crippling diseases could open
the door to the Huxleyan possibility of predetermining the physical
traits of future generations. The root of the problem lies in the fact
that some genetic variations, such as the XYY chromosome abnor-
mality, are not as clearly in need of correction as is Tay-Sachs dis-
ease.76 As an extreme example, societies could come to view certain
physical characteristics, such as blue eyes and blond hair, to be so
desirable that differing traits should be forever eliminated. At the
core of the dilemma is the question of who would decide what is a
disease and what is not. This is fundamentally a question of power
within a society. It is likely that the people who would be classified
as being diseased and in need of "correction" would not be the peo-
ple who would be making the decisions. Genetic engineering thus
could become a tool of social control. Is there a way to shield soci-
ety from potential abuses without negating the unprecedented ben-
74. See id. at 388-89 (statement of Dr. LeRoy Walters).
75. The troublesome ethical questions presented by human gene therapy are dis-
cussed in Fletcher, Moral Problems and Ethical Issues in Prospective Human Gene Therapy, 69
VA. L. REv. 515 (1983). See also Hearings: Human Genetic Engineering, supra note 6, at 156-
57 (statement of Dr. Alexander Capron) (ability to change genes implicates fundamental
ethical values); id. at 388 (statement of Dr. LeRoy Walters)(as we move to more complex
cases, the burden of moral justification becomes greater).
76. It is claimed that the higher representation of "super males" with the XYY chro-
mosome configuration (as opposed to the normal XY configuration) in prisons "proves-
that XYY males are prone to anti-social behavior. The question then arises whether
society should opt for genetic screening to prevent the birth of XYY males, use genetic
therapy to "correct" the XYY configuration, or simply do nothing at all. See Hearings:
Human Genetic Engineering, supra note 6, at 478 (statement of Prof. Troy Duster).
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efits promised by gene therapy? We believe there is, but achieving
that result will require a serious and thoughtful effort by our society.
These questions have already prompted a great deal of debate.
7 7
For instance, in June of 1983, a number of religious leaders from
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish groups signed a "Theological Let-
ter Concerning the Arguments Against Genetic Engineering of the
Human Germline Cells."7 The letter called explicitly for a ban on
research into germline engineering. It also expressed the fear that
continuation of genetic research could lead to unthinkable applica-
tions of the technology. While the letter obviously did not halt the
research, it emphasized the widespread societal concern about the
ethical ramifications of the application of biotechnology to humans.
In November 1982, the Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight of the House Committee on Science and Technology held
three days of hearings on the subject of human genetic engineer-
ing. 79 There was no unanimity among the witnesses on the answers
to the questions raised at those hearings. Every witness, however,
expressed the sentiment that we must begin to examine the issues
now while the technology is still in its earliest stages.
It is becoming clear that the technology to perform gene therapy
may be upon us sooner than originally imagined. The first gene
therapy experiments could occur within a year.80 Although these
experiments will entail only an elementary application of the tech-
77. On July 22, 1982, the New York Times published an editorial entitled "Whether
to Make Perfect Humans." The Times believed the dangers of germline engineering to
be so grave that it suggested serious consideration of "whether the human germline
should be declared inviolable." Calling deliberate manipulation of the human germline
a "watershed in history, perhaps in evolution," the editorial stated that although declar-
ing the human germline inviolable would probably prove unnecessary, the question
should be thoroughly debated in order to reach a full understanding of the issues. "The
remaking of man," said the Times, "deserves a little discussion." N.Y. Times, July 22,
1982, at A22, col. 1.
78. This letter was subsequently placed in the Congressional Record by Senator
Mark Hatfield. See 129 CONG. REC. S.8202 (daily ed. June 10, 1983)(remarks of Senator
Hatfield).
79. These hearings may be found in Hearings: Human Genetic Engineering, supra note 6.
80. Proposals for two gene therapy experiments are currently being prepared. One
experiment will involve treatment of a child with Lesch-Nyhan disease. The other will
involve children with a severe immunological disorder. See Baskin, Doctoring Genes, Sci-
ENCE '84, Dec. 1984, at 53-54. A previous, albeit unsuccessful, attempt at human gene
therapy was made in 1980 by Dr. Martin Cline of the University of California at Los
Angeles. Dr. Cline attempted to use gene therapy to treat two girls who suffered from a
blood disorder. Because Dr. Cline failed to receive permission to conduct the experi-
ments from both the university and the NIH, he was severely reprimanded and stripped
of his research grants. Hearings: Human Genetic Engineering, supra note 6, at 442-462
(statement of Dr. MartinJ. Cline, University of California School of Medicine, Los Ange-
les); id. at 541-45 (statement of Dr. Bernard Talbot, Deputy Director, National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health).
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nology, they represent the first step on a journey to an unknown
destination. The earlier in the journey that society develops guide-
lines for dealing with gene therapy, the smoother the trip will be.
B. The Need for Consensus
Because of the enormous potential impact of biotechnology on
society, answers to the fundamental questions it raises must be the
product of social, not just scientific, consensus. We must acknowl-
edge that biotechnology presents both benefits and risks. A broad
national consensus concerning both the benefits we seek and the
risks we will accept is necessary before technological momentum
and rapid commercial exploitation effectively foreclose the opportu-
nity to ask crucial ethical questions.
It is clear that we have far more to learn about the benefits and
the dangers of human genetic engineering. Unless we achieve a bet-
ter understanding of all its implications, we cannot hope to make
reasoned decisions about the uses of the technology. If a consensus
is not achieved regarding the crucial issue of where to draw the line
between acceptable and unacceptable uses, the pressure of scientific
advancement will severely test the ethical and political framework of
our society.8'
The demands created by rapid scientific advancement must be
counter-balanced by procedural safeguards to ensure that the ethi-
cal questions are adequately addressed. Instead of leaving the cru-
cial decisions concerning the use of gene therapy to any one group
or segment of society, we must formulate democratic processes to
address the anxieties surrounding a technology which has the po-
tential to alter fundamental aspects of human life.
Given the tremendous issues raised by the prospect of human ge-
netic engineering, there is a critical need for review by some estab-
lished forum. While many private and public studies of human
genetic engineering have been conducted, 2 and the Congressional
Office of Technology Assessment has prepared comprehensive anal-
yses of biotechnological issues, 83 as yet no institution exists to moni-
tor developments on an ongoing basis.
There is widespread agreement that some formal mechanism
81. See generally CONG. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, HUMAN GENE THERAPY:
A BACKGROUND PAPER 4 (1984).
82. See Id. at 91-105.
83. See e.g., id.; IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS supra note 10; THE ROLE OF GENETIC
TESTING IN THE PREVENTION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE (1983), COMMERCIAL BIOTECH-
NOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS (1984).
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should be established to address these issues. This sentiment was
perhaps best expressed in November 1982 in testimony before the
Investigations Subcommittee, when the President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Be-
havioral Research called for the creation of a formal oversight
body.8 4 Because it is so vital that we anticipate the consequences of
human gene therapy in advance of the technology's development
and application, legislation was introduced in the Ninety-eighth
Congress to establish a national commission on human genetic en-
gineering. 85 The commission proposal was approved by both the
House of Representatives and the Senate. Unfortunately, it never
became law.86 Similar legislation has been introduced in the Ninety-
ninth Congress.8
7
The proposed commission would have three functions. First, it
would monitor developments in genetic technology that have impli-
cations for human genetic engineering. Second, it would provide a
mechanism for public education about genetic engineering. Third,
and most important, it would provide a forum for considering the
ethical and social issues generated by human genetic engineering.
Additionally, because of the importance of biotechnology and the
complexity of issues raised by it, the commission is designed to en-
sure that a broad and meaningful examination of the issues occurs.
First, the commission would be an independent body. It would not
be housed within any executive agency and would thus have maxi-
mum freedom to consider issues and render reasoned, objective ad-
vice. Furthermore, the commission would be interdisciplinary in its
composition. It would consist of representatives from a variety of
areas, including the general public. A majority of the commission's
members would be nonscientists, to ensure that it focuses on ethical
issues and not on technical scientific concerns. Finally, the commis-
sion would be nonregulatory. It would be a purely advisory body
with no regulatory power whatsoever. The commission would con-
sider developments in genetic engineering and provide advice, in
84. Hearings: Human Genetic Engineering, supra note 6, at 114-21 (statement from Presi-
dent's Commission for the Stud): of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical Re-
search); id. at 176-80 (statement of Alexander Capron).
85. H.R. 2788, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
86. The commission proposal eventually was incorporated as a provision in a larger
piece of legislation reauthorizing the National Institutes of Health. The NIH bill, how-
ever, eventually was vetoed by the President for reasons unrelated to the commission.
See CONFERENCE RE-P. ON H.R. 2350, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
87. S. 1255, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). Additionally, the NIH reauthorization
bills introduced in Congress this year again contain language to create a commission.




the form of written reports to Congress. Acceptance of the commis-
sion's conclusions and recommendations will, of course, depend
upon the force and quality of the reasoning behind them.
V. Conclusion
It is the responsibility of government not only to promote science
but to consider the future path of technology and to anticipate any
problems that technology might present. As biotechnology devel-
ops, it is essential that our nation be informed about its positive and
negative potential. It is especially important that those of us in Con-
gress base our reactions to and decisions about this technology on
objective, reasoned consideration of the issues, and not on misun-
derstandings or exaggerations of its potential for either use or
abuse.
Biotechnology will unquestionably have a tremendous impact on
our society in the years ahead. The challenge we face is how to en-
sure that its benefits are realized while its misuses and dangers are
avoided. Accomplishing this objective requires public education
and reasoned debate over the complex issues that confront us. Leg-
islators have a particular responsibility to ensure-that the necessary
discussion takes place and that we anticipate the questions which
must be answered before events answer them for us. This will re-
quire diligence and continued foresight. The ever-changing nature
of the technology and the emotionally charged atmosphere gener-
ated by the inevitable ethical dilemmas will not make this an easy
task. However, "great powers imply great responsibility."8 8 Con-
gress must meet the challenge of this responsibility with timely
vigor.
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dent's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research).
